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This paper provides arguments for and against M.Lotman’s (2002) contention that Y.Lotman’s
seminal concept of semiosphere is of post-modernist (post-structuralist; Posner 2011)
orientation. A comparative reading of the definitional components of the semiosphere, their
hierarchical relationship and their interactions is undertaken against the two principal axes of
space and subjectivity in the light of Kantian transcendental idealism, as inaugural and
authoritative figure of modernity, the Foucauldian discursive turn and the Deleuzian (post)
radical empiricism (sic), as representative authors of the highly versatile post-modernvernacular.
This comparative reading aims at highlighting not only similarities and differences between the
Lotmanian conceptualization of the semiosphere and the concerned modernist and post-
modernist authors, but the construct’s operational relevance in a post-metanarratives cultural
predicament that has been coupled with the so-called spatial turn in cultural studies (Hess-
Luttich 2012).
1 Introduction
In order to start hinting at the prospect of providing definite answers to such a complex and
multifaceted question that merely affords to intensify the complexity and the multifaceted
nature of the very conceptual construct of semiosphere let us begin by clarifying how post-
modernity has been defined. Post-modernity has been defined in two dominant ways. First,
as a historical period that is characterized by a highly critical outlook towards the intellectual
heritage of the Enlightenment (with any and many issues that emerge in such historical
demarcations; see Lagopoulos 2010). Nevertheless, Lyotard (1991: 34) himself asserted that
“postmodernity is not a new age, but the rewriting of some of the features claimed by
modernity”. Second, as an ethos (scientific or otherwise) which, regardless of the feasibility of
situating its emergence spatiotemporally (and ample arguments have been voiced as to why
situating it within a tradition contradicts the very ‘post’ nature of post-modernity), still it
reflects common argumentative patterns and stylistic aspects that recur (not at all invariably)
throughout various writers, from Nietzsche to Breton to Deleuze. Post-modernist perspec-
tives also differ based onwhether they are ofMarxist or non-Marxist affiliation, inwhich case
Marxist perspectives (e. g., Jameson) view post-modernity as the cultural logic of post-
industrial capitalism. “Postmodern culture is the result of the extension of the market over
cultural production as a whole, whence the need for a political economy of cultural
production” (Lagopoulos 2010: 178). Non-Marxist perspectives, largely aligned with Bau-
drillard’s notion of hyperreality (e. g., Perry 1998; regardless of Baudrillard’s own leftist
affiliations), view post-modernity as a predicament where empirical and cultural reality are
largely shaped by the fleeting imagery that is projected through the media. This predicament
is marked by a diminution of the centrality of Reason’s faculties and operations in conferring
judgments about the world (rational, ethical, aesthetic), in the face of a life-stylism without
reserve. There are also perspectives that lie in between, such asHabermas’s attempt to salvage
Kantianism by substituting (with questionable results) the Court of Reason with instru-
mental reason and pragmatic criteria against the background of a community of rational
social actors.
Post-modernism is a highly fragmented research field and certainly this is not the place to
engagewith the plethora of perspectives across various disciplines that have been laying claim
to be of post-modernist orientation. However, insofar as a fundamental point of convergence
among various post-modernist perspectives has been concerned with a highly critical
outlook towards the centrality of Kantian Reason and its architecture in freeing humanity
from the yoke of Medievalism and superstition, the Kantian (modernist) outlook to the
formation of subjectivity is a core aspect of the modernist vision.
According to some scholars post-modernity does not mark a radical rupture with the
tradition of philosophy, but, just like deconstruction (which may be viewed as part of the
wider skeptical outlook of post-modernity towards meta-narratives and totalizing/essen-
tializing forms of discourse), an attempt to lay bare latent presuppositions and tropically
cloaked syllogistic aporias behind seemingly self-evident ‘facts of Reason’. However, this does
not entail necessarily that, as Deely (2011: 32) contends, “postmodernity so far as it pertains
to philosophy names some epoch within that history”. If we subscribe to the argument that
‘post’ is just another epoche (from theAristotelian epechei and epekeina tes ousias; seeDerrida
1981), the entire ‘trend’ of post-modernity is reduced to another sublatable moment in the
linear teleological deployment of an essentializing epiphenomenology, rather than con-
stituting a radically ‘other’way of thinking (at least for some post-modernists or authors who
have been identified, willingly or not, with post-modernity).
Immanuel Kant has been at the receiving end of vehement attacks that have been
traditionally launched by post-modernists against modernity, for the sheer reason that the
anti-foundationalist tendencies that have been definitive of post-modern theorists share a
commonmistrust towards totalizing architectural hyper-constructs, such as the architecture
of Pure Reason. In this sense, an examination of arguments for and against the alleged post-
modernist orientation of the semiosphere is bound to engage with how equivalent concepts
were defined and operationalized by pre post-modern (or modern) and post-modern
theorists. To this end, this paper assumes as theoretical groundwork whereupon the ensuing
discussion deploys Kant’s conception of space and Foucault’s, Deleuze’s conceptions of space
(as indicative authors who have been largely identified with the post-modernist vernacular).
The latter camp also features perspectives on cultural geography and cultural spaces which
have developed largely from within a post-modernist conceptualization of space.
The analysis begins with an exposition of the concept of the semiosphere by drawing on
Lotman’s seminal works, as well as on relevant commentaries that have attempted either to
elucidate or to expand this allegedly multifaceted concept. Then it proceeds with an
exploration of arguments for and against why the semiosphere is and is not modernist and
post-modernist by recourse to key thinkers from each part of the pre/post divide, mainly
Kant, Foucault and Deleuze. The discussion concludes by pointing out directions whereby
the semiosphere may be fruitfully extended by attending to post-modernist conceptualiza-
tions of space and subjectivity.
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2 What is the semiosphere (and what is not ‘it’)?
“The concept of semiosphere was ﬁrst put forward by Juri Lotman in the context of cultural
semiotics. He introduced the term in the article ‘On semiosphere’ and elaborated it further in
Universe of theMind andCulture and Explosion” (Kull, Kotov 2011: 179). The semiosphere is
a necessary condition for the existence and function of languages and other sign-systems
(Kull, Kotov 2011). “In defining the semiosphere Lotman ismaking a clear shift from the level
of individual signs and their functioning in semiotic space toward a higher level of network
semiosis and system level phenomena” (Andrews 2003: 34). As repeatedly argued in the
relevant literature (e. g., Kull 2005, 2011) the semiosphere is a multi-level and multi-faceted
construct that seeks to delineate how cultural spaces are produced as multi-level inscriptions
in an all-encompassing semiospheric hyperspace, like matryoshka dolls within dolls. The
semiosphere constitutes anumbrella concept ormetaconcept that designates a semiotic space
that is made of various interlocking spheres with identifiable boundaries. “As ametaconcept,
semiosphere is a ‘construct of semiotic method’ (Kull 2005) that takes a holistic approach to
culture, and as an object it refers to a given semiotic space” (Semenenko 2012: 120). “The
semiosphere is heterogeneous space (or communicative medium), enabling qualitative
diversity to emerge, to fuse, and to sustain” (Kull 2005: 185). “Lotman especially stresses that
the semiosphere is not just the sum total of semiotic systems, but also a necessary condition
for any communication act to take place and any language to appear” (Semenenko 2012: 112).
Each sphere in a semiospheric space is in a constant dialogue (a point of intersection between
Lotman and Bakhtin’s notion of dialogism; cf. Bethea 1997) with every other sphere in
varying degrees. “New information in the semiosphere can be produced only as a result of a
dialogue between different codes, by which he [Lotman] understands not simply different
human or artificial languages, but different ways of organizing reality into coherent cognitive
structures, or different ways of making reality conform to our understanding” (Steiner
2003: 42).
The semiosphere in its most abstract conceptualization, as noted by Kull (2005) and
Lotman (2002), is the elementary unit of signification, a postulate that sets apart Tartu School
semiotics from atomistic perspectives that seek elementary units at the level of minimal
(rather than maximal) concepts (e. g., the theory of double/triple/multiple articulation).
“Four fundamental concepts are associatedwith the semiosphere: heterogeinety, asymmetry,
boundedness, binarism” (Andrews 2003: 35). Zylko (2001: 398–400) summarizes the most
significant aspects of the concept of semiosphere as follows:
First, “the notion of semiosphere is related to definite homogeneity and individuality [. . .]
Messages from the outside have to force their way through to become facts of a given
semiosphere. To do this, they have to adapt to the conditions of a given semiospehere in such a
way that the alien may become familiar. What is external becomes internal; what is nontext
becomes text.”
Second, “the internal organization of semiosphere is characterized by a lack of
predetermined order. The hierarchy of languages and texts is constantly subverted; they
collide as if they existed in one level.”
Third, “the organization of semiosphere is marked by internal heterogeneity. The
organization and structuring of particular centers can vary considerably. Lotman assigns
special meanings to peripheries, which are less formally organized than centers and have
more flexible constructions at their disposal [. . .] In this account, peripheries are considered a
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reservoir of innovation and a source of dynamic processes, within semiosphere.” In line with
his previous theorization of modeling systems and the derivative distinction between
primary and secondary modeling systems “natural language takes the central position in the
semiosphere because it permeates almost all semiospheric levels and quite a number of
semiotic systems are based on it (e. g., literature and partially cinema and theater)”
(Semenenko 2012: 113).
Fourth, “the structural unevenness of a semiosphere’s internal organization is determined
by the fact that different domains evolve at different speeds.”
Fifth, [. . .] according to Lotman, “dialogue is the universal law which stipulates how
semiosphere exists. This dialogue proceeds in different spheres, ranging from the individual’s
cerebral hemispheres to the cultural contact on the national and international scale. As a
consequence, semiosphere consists of levels, which range from each person’s autonomous
semiosphere to the overall semiosphere of the contemporary world.”
Since out focal concern in this paper consists in furnishing answers to the question
whether the semiosphere is of post-modernist orientation, two aspects of the semiosphere
will be explored in this section in the light of Lotman’s prolific writings, but also of relevant
commentaries that have surfaced over the past thirty years (cf. Kull 2011 for an extensive
review of relevant texts), viz. (i) what kind of space is the semiospheric space (and, by
implication, how it gives rise to cultural spacing) (ii) how the semiotic subject is conditioned
existentially by the semiosphere that allows for subjects’ enculturation who are, in turn,
responsible for a semiosphere’s extension (or contraction) and its ‘creative’ propagation.
These two pillars of space and cultural subjectivity constitute the principal axes whereupon
the comparative reading between Lotmanian semiotics, Kant as inaugural and authoritative
modernist author and key post-modernist authors, with a focus onDeleuze and Foucault will
be construed.
Lotman’s account of the semiosphere is not bereft of ambiguities which have turnedout to
be particularly inviting to diverse scholarly interpretations1. Nöth (2014) rightly claims that
Lotman exhibits a considerably varied definitional approach to the concept of ‘semiosphere’.
“The terms ‘semiosphere’, ‘semiotic space’ and ‘culture’ are not sharply delimited in relation
to each other” (Nöth 2014: 2). Despite Lotman’s precluding outright the strictlymetaphorical
1 Kull (2005) identified the following interpretations of the semiosphere upon conducting a relevant survey
among scholars at a conference and pursuant to an extensive literature review: “(1)’semiosphere is a textual
whole, a text together with other texts thatmake it a text’ (2) ‘semiosphere is anything formed from the (endless)
web of interpretations’ (3) ‘semiosphere is the sphere of communication’. It “consists in communication”
(Hoffmeyer 1997: 933) (4) semiosphere is a web of sign processes, or semioses’ (5) “Semiosphere is the set of all
interconnected umwelten. Any two umwelten, when communicating, are a part of the same semiosphere” (Kull
1998: 305) (6) ‘semiosphere is the space of semioses’. The concept of ‘space’ appears to describe an important
aspect of the semiosphere, e. g., (7) ‘semiosphere is the space of meaning-generation’. Also, (8) ‘semiosphere is
the space of whole-part relations’ (9) ‘semiosphere is where distinguishing occurs, where distinctions aremade’.
And as a reformulation of this definition, (10) ‘semiosphere is the space of qualitative diversity’. (11)
‘semiosphere is a sphere of healing’. This is because in a non-semiosphere, there is no such condition as ‘healthy’
or ‘ill’ or even ‘broken’. There cannot be ‘errors’ outside the semiosphere. Unlike the physical world, which
manifests a single truthful reality, (12) ‘semiosphere is the world ofmultiple truths, ofmultiple worlds’. (13) “the
totality of ‘contrapuntal duets’ forms the sphere of communication — the semiosphere” (Emmeche et al.
2002: 21). According to T. Sebeok (2001: 164): “Biosemiotics presupposes the axiomatic identity of the
semiosphere with the biosphere” (14) “semiosphere is thus the totality of interconnected signs, a sphere
that covers the Earth” (Emmeche et al. 2002: 21) (15) ‘semiosphere as a continuumof culture’ (16) ‘semiosphere
is the region of multiple realities’ (or, semiosphere is the world of several realities).
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essence of the concept (“Lotman, in his ﬁrst paper ‘On the semiosphere’ explicitly rejects the
metaphorical interpretation of the semiotic space of culture” [Nöth 2006: 251]), as Nöth
(2006, 2014) remarks, metaphorical aspects clearly appear to be seething into the semio-
sphere’s definitional scope. However, in order to account more concretely for why the
semiosphere is not merely metaphorical, it is suggested that we address, complementary to
Nöth’s argument for the capacity of the semiosphere to function as modeling blueprint of
culture, regardless of whether its existence may be conceived of separately from a strictly
delimited in naturalistic terms biosphere, and hence as generativist mechanism of
metaphors, rather than being a metaphor itself, Lotman’s (1990) own contention that a
natural space (e. g., the space of a city) is always already semiotized. “The city is a complex
semiotic mechanism, a culture generator, but it carries out this function only because it is a
melting pot of texts and codes, belonging to all kinds of languages and levels” (Lotman
1990: 174–175). Hence, even if the semiosphere was not approached from amodeling device
viewpoint, still its existence may not be merely metaphorical insofar as a comparison with a
non-metaphorical or biospheric space (Vernadsky’s original conception), such as the natural
space whereupon a city is built does not in itself have meaning prior to its constituting a city.
“While the biosphere, according to Vernadsky and Lotman, is ‘the totality of and the organic
whole of living matter and also the condition for the continuation of life,’ the semiosphere is
‘the result and the condition for the development of culture’” (Nöth 2006: 253–254). And
insofar as the constitution of a city walks hand in hand with its textualization it is always
already semiotized.Does this automatically render the city ametaphorical construct? At least
based on the original meaning of metaphor as transportation to another place, it certainly
does. Yet, this transportationmerely attests to the fundamental distinction between space and
place. Space, at least natural space, means nothing prior to its transformation into place (see
Low and Lawrence-Zuniga 2007). This transformation by default depends on the semiotiza-
tion of space.Hence, space depends on place for its existence. Place is the existential condition
of space.
Space, which is continuous in human cognition, becomes transformed into a space with discrete
loci in the cultural semiosphere. Whereas the cognition of real space presupposes perceptual
continuity, the culturally organized semiotic space is as discontinuous as the verbal signs that
represent it. (Nöth 2006: 254)
By the same token, culture depends on the semiosphere for its existence. What still merits
elucidation, at least in the context of the problematic that is raised in this paper, is not somuch
whether the semiosphere is a metaphorical construct or not, but how it differs from other
concepts that have been occasionally employed by Lotman and that seem to be dependent on
the semiosphere, as well as concepts that have been employed interchangeably with the
semiosphere. More particularly, in order to provide definite answers about the nature of the
semiosphere, its contents and/or its levels we should first clarify how the concept functions as
either inclusive or structurally homologous to the following concepts: (i) semiosphere(s) vs.
sphere(s) (ii) semiotic space(s) (iii) markers of spatial orientation, such as inside/outside
(iv) demarcationmarkers, such as boundary. Our analytic will now turn to the elaboration of
the relationships between the semiosphere and these hyponymic (with question-marks)
spatial constructs.
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2.1 Semiosphere(s) vs. sphere(s)
Wealready saw that semiosphere is an existential conditionvis-à-vis cultural spaces and texts.
Also, in principle “semiosphere as a metaconcept allows for describing larger entities of
semiosis that transcend national borders (e. g., film noir, rock’n’roll music or art nouveau
architecture) as well as ‘microcultures’ of various groups or even ‘individual cultures’”
(Semenenko 2012: 124). Yet, Lotman (1990) applies the concept of culture, even though
largely refraining from explicitly framing it conceptually as such, within geographically
demarcated spaces (e. g., the analysis of geographical space inRussianmedieval texts; Lotman
1990: 171–176), that is within the boundaries of national cultures (cf. Wodak et al. 2009 for
differences between culture and state or national culture) This is highly debatable, especially
in the face of globalization and the trans-national predominance of cultural forms, such as
fashion andmusic. It is also question-beggingwhether, if we pursue the syllogismof a cultural
centre as resting with cultural traits that partake of a national culture, then at the centre one
would encounter folkloric garments and national anthemswhichwould be of greater gravitas
than, say, global fashion icons andmusical artists, whowould lie at the periphery of a national
culture.
The topographical model of cultural centre vs. periphery is most pertinent for mapping
out the diachronic evolution of texts and semiotic spaces within a semiosphere, however no
assumptions may be made a priori about the relative salience of national culture as against
global cultural forms. Even though this is a matter for exploration in a different paper, suffice
it to point out that if this indeed were the case, that is an inverse relationship held within
nationally geographically demarcated cultures between national culture and global culture,
then national cultureswould lie at the periphery of a global culturewhich transcends national
boundaries andwhich lies at the centre of the semiosphere. Thiswould also imply that there is
only one semiosphere and not different semiospheres, that is one for each nation. A different
viewpoint would be furnished if culture were approached from a nation-centric angle in
terms of the internal dynamics of the various semiotic spaces and texts that populate the
semiosphere (inwhich instance one would expect that national cultural traits would not lie at
the outskirts of the semiosphere, at least not at the farthest outskirts, but closer to the centre,
or somewhere between the centre and the periphery). Surely these are hypotheses that remain
to be verified through concrete, empirical research. However, the very problematization of
whether semiosphere should be approached prima facie as globally uniform or as a
multiplicity of nationally demarcated semiospheres resonates a more fundamental issue
and an ambiguity that occasionally overshadows Lotman’s analytic, viz., whether we may
refer to a hierarchically stratified space that consists of various semiospheres or it is only valid
to lay claim to a uniform semiospheric space that consists of various spheres.
In theUniverse of theMind (1990) Lotman alludes to cultural spheres, obviously as part of
awider semiospheric space. Each semiotic sphere has its own language, from simpler tomore
complex, and from strictly formalized to more fluid. “These languages are not equivalent to
one another, but at the same time are mutually interprojected and have various degrees of
translatability” (Semenenko 2012: 113). According to Semenenko, meaning is generated in
communicative acts precisely through the tension that exists among the various languages
that make up the distinctive spheres of a semiospheric space. “This makes the semiosphere
the universal mechanism of meaning generation” (Semenenko 2012: 113). However, Lotman
also lays claim to the existence of different semiospheres.
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The problem is that if different semiospheres exist, but also different spheres within
semiospheres (not to mention the hierarchically inferior semiotic spaces and texts- and even
individual signs), then we are confronted either with a progressus in infinitum or with a
regressus ad infinitum. In order to resolve this pro/regress it would be prudent to view the
semiospheric space as all-encompassing with regard to the rest categories that make up this
overarching and all-inclusive spatial form, at the exclusion of the possibility of the existence of
multiple semiospheres whichwouldmitigate the very unificatory (within heterogeneity) task
that this construct is summoned to accomplish. And insofar as the semiosphere is equivalent
to the spatial condition of the possibility of semiotic existence, anything that lies beyond the
semiospheric space is not part of another semiosphere, but of non-meaningful void.
Nöth (2006) interprets the existence of different semiospheres by recourse to Lotman’s
early distinction between primary and secondary modeling systems, where natural language
functions as primary modeling system and cultural forms such as art and religion as
secondary modeling systems. “This hierarchy of stratiﬁed semiospheres begins above the
level that is still without any semiotic modeling, that is at the level of the nonsemiotic world
of things. The transition to the ﬁrst semiosphere leads to the system of signs and social
languages; higher semiospheres are those of myth, art, and religion” (Nöth 2006: 259).
However, this distinction was later abandoned by Lotman (see Semenenko 2012) and rightly
so insofar as “natural language is rarely a system representing the world in a direct or even
simpleway, if at all (cf. Sebeok 1991: 58–59)” (Nöth 2006: 258). The same ambiguity emerges,
as we shall see in due course, in the instance of the role performed by ‘boundary’ or
‘boundaries’ that is whether they unite and divide at the same time two semiospheres (in the
sense of a semiosphere and its other, still as semiosphere) or different semiotic spaces or
spheres within a uniform semiospehric space. Both interpretations are encountered in the
relevant literature, however, again, it ismore prudent to operationalize the boundary as intra-
semiospheric membranes that allow for cross-fertilizations among distinctive semiotic
spaces and the texts that make up each semiotic space.
2.2 Semiotic space(s)
If culture is equivalent to the semiosphere (Lotman 1990), then distinctive cultural spaces are
equivalent todiscrete semiotic spaceswithin the semiosphere.However, the semiospheremay
not just consist in an aggregate of specific spaces (or places as already semiotized spaces), as
this empiricist viewpoint would contravene Lotman’s fundamental position concerning the
role of the semiosphere as “the semiotic space necessary for the existence and functioning of
languages” (Lotman 1990: 123). Lotman’s conceptualization of the semiosphere displays
considerable similarity to Kantian space as pure form of intuition (as will be shown in the
ensuing section), while substituting intuition with semiosis in abstracto. However, a
contradiction is lurking in the background concerning the equivalence between semiosphere
and culture. If culture constitutes a secondary modeling mechanism that is hierarchically
superior to natural language and if both natural language and culture exist within the same
semiosphere, then the same semiosphere may not accommodate both natural language and
culture. This antinomical relationship might be resolved by recourse to hierarchically
ordered semiospheres. However, positing two semiospheres would generate a new impasse,
viz., if there are two generativist mechanisms that are independent of each other, and given
that beyond the boundaries of a semiosphere lies semiotic void, how can the one function as
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primary modeling system for the other? Hence, the assertion “in this hierarchy of levels, the
secondary levels are always conceived of as semiotic space with more dimensions in relation
to the space of its lower levels” (Nöth 2006: 259)may not concern different semiospheres, but
different semiotic spaces within the same all-encompassing semiospheric space. Yet, semiotic
spaces within the semiosphere retain their irreducible heterogeneity (Kull, Kotov 2011). If
different cultural forms (e. g., fashion, music) constitute different textual systems and if
cultural spacing is rendered possible through textual forms, then the contents of a
semiosphere are tantamount to textual forms. A cultural space within the semiosphere
is the outcome of textualization. At the same time, according to Lotman, the subject is
conditioned by a collective intellect whose memory is engraved in texts. “If individual
memory is preserved in the mind, collective memory rests on texts” (Semenenko 2012: 117).
The general text concept used by cultural semiotics is suitable to be used by all disciplines
involved in the study of cultural phenomena. It is equally applicable to the subject matter studied
by philology, history, architecture, art history, musicology, and the new media disciplines. Its
utilization contributes to the bridging of disciplinary boundaries and to the formation of a non-
metaphorical conceptual basis for research into the structure and function of sign complexes in
all media. (Posner 2004: 115)
“Lotmanbaseshis approachonthebroadconceptof textaccording towhicheveryartifactwith
a function and a codedmessage can be regarded as a text; he notes, however, that every culture
selects fromthe setof these texts a small subsetwhich itsmembers consider important for their
cultural identity” (Posner 2004: 118). Lotman’s emphasis on the criteria for textual selection
(and, furthermore, of particular signs from distinctive texts) is most pertinent for mapping
dynamically sources of textual formation. “Culture is the totality of texts or one complexly
constructed text” (Lotman et al. 1978: 233). Hence, strictly speaking from a Lotmanian point
ofview,whatweareprimarilyconcernedwith iswhatmaybecalledmodesof (inter)textual co-
conditioning between cultural units (artifacts) and subjects (insofar as a text is always another
text’s inter-text;Orr1987: 814).Culturalunits areconstantlydesemiotized, inLotman’s terms,
and resemiotized in discrete communicative contexts. “The removal of text from the usual
norms of semiotic meaning and its outward desemiotization are conditions for the semiotic
meaning of the text” (Lotman et al. 1978: 242). Insofar as, for Lotman, existence is
inconceivable outside of a community we may infer that the very constitution of the subject
is textual. In recapitulation, cultural spaces are delimited by texts, while texts construe and
maintain the collective intellect on which a subject depends for its textual existence.
2.3 Markers of spatial orientation (inside/outside, centre/periphery)
“We know that spatial categories, such as ‘center versus periphery,’ ‘up versus down’ or
‘foreground versus background’ are omnipresent not only in the verbal representation of
space but also in the form ofmetaphors representing abstract concepts in everyday language”
(Nöth 2006: 253). Such spatial categories are instrumental in finding one’s way through the
hyperreal cultural maze of the semiosphere. Having already clarified what constitutes the
inside of a semiospheric space and what amounts to its outside, let us focus on the notions of
cultural centre vs. periphery.
The centre of a semiospheric space is equivalent to the cultural spaces and their
accompanying (conditioning) textual forms and texts that are responsible for upholding the
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uniformityof a culture (a culture’smetatexts). The periphery consists of non-integral cultural
spaces and texts, what we may call a cultural centre’s ‘underground’. A dominant cultural
centre is always in a dialectical relationshipwith its periphery. In fact it feeds on the periphery,
while the periphery constitutes a non-redundant entropic deposit that poses a threat to a
cultural kernel inasmuch as the creative condition of its survival through renewal. Indeed, in
an era that is marked by excessive connectivity among social actors on an international scale,
enabled by increasingly rapid electronic communications, the rate at which texts and cultural
units migrate from periphery to center, but also the scale on which such migrations are
effected, could be characterized as being of unparalleled proportions compared to previous
historical periods. “Cultural dynamics consists in this fact above others: that nucleus and
periphery can change places. What used to be central is now peripheral, and vice versa”
(Zylko 2001: 402). Lotman’s conception of the relationship between the centre and the
periphery of a culture and the relative salience of various textual sources in a semiosphere is
crucial for mapping out cultural dynamics.
2.4 Demarcation markers (boundary/ies)
Lotman employs the notion of the boundary predominantly in two different senses, as what
separates the inside of a semiosphere from its outside (Lotman 1990: 131; Lotman 2004: 115),
as well as the porous, membrane-like stuff that unites and separates at the same time, but also
allows for the communication amongst distinctive semiotic spaces within a semiosphere.
Regarding the first definitional prong, as Nöth (2006: 255) remarks: “In Lotman’s cultural
semiotics, it is the boundary that separates a culture fromnonculture or the culture of alterity.
It separates the territory of one’s own, good and harmonious culture from its bad, chaotic, or
even dangerous anticulture”. As regards the second definitional prong, Andrews (2003: 18)
contends that “membranes are viewed in Lotman’s theory as discontinuities. It is only
through discontinuity that the illusion of continuous perception is possible”. “In this way,
boundary that is deﬁned as an at least double-coded system of translation ﬁlters both
determines the identity of the system and allows the translation of messages between the
different semiotic systems” (Kull, Kotov 2011: 182–183).
Pursuant to the elucidation of the various spatial forms that make up the semiospheric
space let us proceed with the examination of how space has been framed by seminal
modernist and post-modernist authors, while drawing parallels with and points of di-
vergence from Lotmanian theory.
3 Kant’s modernist conceptualization of space as pure form of intuition
According to Kant’s transcendental idealism, space and time constitute pure forms of
intuition and primary conditions of empirical understanding and knowledge. As against an
empirical realist approach that considers the notion of space as an abstraction from
empirically lived spaces, transcendental idealism posits space as an a priori condition of
empirical intuition and hence as a formal condition for experiencing phenomena that
impinge on sensibility.
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Space is not an empirical conception which can be abstracted from external experiences. For in
order that certain sensations may be related to something external to me (that is to something in
a part of space different from that in which I am), and similarly, in order that I may represent
them as outside of and next to each other, and consequently as not merely different from each
other but also as in different places, the representation of space must already be there as a basis.
(Garnett 1939: 166)
This non-empirically dependent representation of space and hence pure and a prioristic form
of intuition (intuitus purus) that conditions empirical spatial representations is part and
parcel of the architectural mechanism of Pure Reason and hence located in the Mind (not
necessarily as physical brain). Objects (of any form, including cultural artefacts) are
constituted as such through successive acts of synthesis from various functions and faculties
of empirical understanding and of Reason, starting with the synthesis of sensible phenomena
against the background of the a priori forms of intuition (space and time) and moving
progressively through the synthetic acts of apperception, transcendental imagination and
conscious judgments that allow us to cognize and recognize, roughly speaking, empirical
objects as identical throughout their multifarious manifestations in various contexts. An
object, according to Kant, may not be known in itself (as ding-an-sich and its noumenal
counterpart or object x) directly and in an unmediated fashion, that is outside of
understanding and Reason’s own faculties and forms of sensibility. This would amount
to what Kant called in the first Critique a paralogism of Pure Reason, that is claiming that
objects may be known in themselves regardless of the synthetic activities of Reason’s faculties
that are responsible for synthesizing objects or for objectifying them as such.
The fact that a self, and by extension a culturally constituted self, cannot exist outside of
space does not refer to an empirical self that is located in place A at time Y, but to a
transcendental self (as carrier of the transcendental apparatus of Reason) that conditions the
empirical self. The transcendental self is equipped with pure forms of sensibility “in so far as
they are presupposed in the sensation of things and thus cannot be abstracted from outer
sensations” (Caygill 2000: 373) and space is an integral part of these conditions. “They are
pure in that they cannot be derived from experience, a priori in that they are antecedent to any
and every act of thinking, formal in that they order the manifold of appearance, and
intuitions in so far as their manner of ordering thematter of sensibility is distinct from that of
a concept (they co-ordinate but do not subsume their manifold)” (Caygill 2000: 374).
If an empirical self is responsible for producing texts and other objects of empirical
understanding, this is because it is dependent on a transcendental self who is the carrier of the
faculties of Pure Reason (an ‘I/me’ dialectic that survived through the aeons, reaching up to
existential phenomenology). Space is “given to the mind prior to all perceptions” (Garnett
1939: 166). Hence, place and cultural spaces are dependent for their existence on space as
pure form of sensibility and integral part of empirical understanding. This conceptualization
of space is equivalent to a pure representation insofar as in order to function as a priori form it
must not be dependent on sensible content. However, in order to function it requires sensible
content. Sensible content is sensible for a pure form of sensibility, inasmuch as space as form
of sensibility is conditioning vis-a-vis its sensible content. In the Kantian sense, space as a
priori form is devoid of content, while the transcendental self to whom this pure form of
sensibility belongs may be said to live in a ‘void’ or empty space (metaphorically speaking).
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4 Why the semiosphere is and is not modernist
The subjugation of the empirical self and its lived spatial reality to the atemporal
transcendental subject that is the carrier of the faculties of Pure Reason and hence the
former’s sine qua non has beenvehemently criticized by post-modernists onvarious grounds.
A major and still open ground of ongoing contestation revolves around the possibility of
so-called a priori synthetic judgments. In short, a priori synthetic judgments are judgments
of empirical understanding, yet whose nature is non-empirically binding. Obviously, in any
empirical instance involving other than analytical judgments (e. g., geometrical axioms), due
to the cultural relativity and radical situatedness of the subjects that confer judgments about
facts-of-the-world, the content and the value of these judgments are likely to vary, thus
rendering the a prioristic validity of such judgments particularly question-begging.
Judgments of empirical understanding are unquestionably synthetic (from a Kantian point
of view) insofar as they consist of subsuming perceptual phenomena under categories of
empirical knowledge (e. g., visual appearance Xunder the empirical category of table-clothe),
however the inter-subjectively uniform subsumption of visual phenomenon X under
empirical category Y is a subject of cultural agreement and hence not a priori given (in
the same manner as forms of pure intuition, that is space and time, are given a priori to the
cognizing subject).
If there is no a priori legitimacy in empirical judgments and if empirical judgments are
dependent on agreement among members of interpretive communities, then what kind of
criteria of legitimacy may be furnished by Pure Reason? “If I am unable to say not only that
this A is the sun and this B is a stone but also that this B is at least a body, all the universal and
necessary laws that the concepts of the pure intellect guarantee me are worth nothing,
because they could refer to any datum of experience” (Eco 2000: 73). “It’s always that same
modern thing,wherewe’re imposing forms on theworld by not being informed by theworld”
(Clarke 2005: 19). And if the echelons of Reason are always functional for a cognizing subject
qua situated observer who is by default constrained by culturally constituted interpretative
categories for cognizing objects and for producing cultural artefacts, then space is not a pure
formof intuition, as lower-ranking function of a transcendental subject’s apparatus, but of an
always already culturally pre-constituted empirical self. If the subject is first and foremost
empirical and culturally constituted, then space may also be viewed as a formal condition for
cognizing culture, while recognizing one’s a priori cultural spacing. In this sense, the
semiosphere is certainly not Kantian and hence non-modern, but also more akin to a
culturally relativistic post-modern conceptualization. However, it does retain pre post-
modernist vestiges in its meta-theoretical nucleus, viz., its constituting a formal condition of
cultural production that is not the sum of its parts and hence being posited as a formal
condition of the possibility of cultural production which is akin to the Kantian con-
ceptualization.
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5 Post-modernist conceptions of space, discursivity and subjectivity:
Foucault and Deleuze in focus
5.1 Lotman vs. Foucault
The production of knowledge as discourse walks hand in hand with power relations for
Foucault. “While the human subject is placed in relations of production and signification, he
is equally placed in power relations which are very complex” (Foucault 1982: 778). This
constitutes a most divergent point of departure in the theorization of how knowledge is
produced between modernism and post-modernism. Hence, whereas Kant was mostly
concerned with the self-generating epistemic powers of Reason, Foucault is concerned more
with the social forces that are conducive to the consolidation and normalization of certain
discursive formations at the expense of others. In this context space and discourse are
inextricably linked. “The problematics of power encounters spatial organization. Foucault is
not generally interested in matters of geography, although he confesses in an interview that
his genealogy of knowledge is tied to the techniques and strategies of power, which are
deployed through the distribution, delimitation, and control of territories and the
organization of domains, leading to a kind of geopolitics” (Lagopoulos 2010: 215). Of
course, since Foucault’s time, cultural geography “which concentrates upon the ways in
which space, place and the environment participate in an unfolding dialogue of meaning”
(Shurmer-Smith 2002: 3) has become an entrenched field in cultural studies.
The concept of epistemological space initially delineates a doubling of language, thought, or
knowledge by their respective conditions of possibility, which transforms them from linear
entities to be interpreted, to exterior “depths” demanding an “archaeological” analysis. Later on
Foucault’s concept of space would be further elaborated to supplement a “deep”, “outside”
doubling of language, thought and knowledge, by practices, power relations, andmaterial spatial
environments. This elaborated concept of space then makes up a dispositif (or apparatus) of
mutually enabling spatial practices. (West-Pavlov 2009: 121)
Lotman does share the genealogical methodological principle that underpins Foucault’s
‘archaeology’, however he does not emphasize the importance of power relations in the
production of knowledge and when he refers fleetingly to such relations (e. g., in Lotman
2004) he does not regard them as a proper subject of semiotic analysis (see Schönle 2001: 68–
69). He considers the cultural centre in the dialectic between centre and periphery as more of
a necessary condition for the avoidance of a culture’s disintegration, rather than the outcome
of stabilizing forces in a power play. Concomitantly, Lotman’s conception of the textual
constitution of the subject as a direct reflex of a collective mind does display similarities with
Foucault’s perspective on the formation of the subject as the outcome of internalization of
various discourses, albeit not focusing on how power mechanisms function at the exclusion
of some discourses from the centre of a cultural semiospheric space. In this respect Lotman’s
semiosphere may be labeled as post-modernist, insofar as it does recognize the discursive
constitution of the subject, inasmuch as not post-modernist, insofar as it does not emphasize
the power mechanisms that are responsible for the ‘hegemonic’ imposition of which codes,
texts, signs give rise to the cultural spaces that make up the centre of a cultural semiospheric
space.
Furthermore, whereas Lotman posits the existence of a collective intellect and subscribes
to the theory of consciousness as well as to a unified conceptualization of the semiosphere, in
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which case modernist vestiges are retained in the form of an essentializing knowing subject
and a totalizing outlook to the formation of culture (with the proviso of the recognition of
heterogeneity as intra-semiospheric organizational principle), Foucault neither endorses the
primacyof the subject in knowledge formation, nor the notion of a collective intellect. “InThe
Order of Things, Foucault undermines our tendency to think that each of us is a self-sufficient,
meaning-giving cogito by recounting the history of the construction of the Cartesian subject
and the Kantian agent” (Dreyfus 2004). Above all, he vehemently denounces any validity in
attempts at unifying distinctive discursive practices under a totalizing or archi-discourse. Yet,
by virtue of acknowledging the influence power structures play in the relative stability and
dominance of certain discursive formations, we are certainly not flawed in at least
provisionally lending credence to the hypothesis that similar power mechanisms are at
play in an attempt to maintain a unifying thread that cuts across different discursive
formations, inasmuch as in upholding the boundaries that separate and unite different
discourses, or, in Lotman’s terms, in determining which discourses populate the centre and
which the periphery of a culture.Moreover, Lotman’s stipulation that a semiotic space and its
attendant language may be produced by recourse to a given code and that in a semiospheric
space more than one codes are likely to co-exist, each being irreducible to each other,
resonates Foucault’s conceptualization of the co-existence of irreducible discursive forma-
tions. The difference is that Foucault would be in principle antipathetic to the endorsement of
the structuralist conception of code as generativist mechanism (even though it must be borne
into mind that such generativism, for Lotman, concerns the modeling capacity of semiotics,
rather than an inherent property of a semiotic space, in which case it is a methodological
concept, rather than ontological and hence not likely to be dissonant with Foucault’s wider
anti-ontological posture).
Another crucial difference between the Foucauldian conception of spatiality and the
relationship between spatialmetaphors and the production of subjectivity concerns Lotman’s
insistence on the existence of a cultural centre. This spatial metaphor connotes the existence
of a centralized command-line or, at least, a virtual network of cultural mediators (akin to a
kyberneion)who issue commands as towhich codes and textswill populate the cultural centre
in each stage of a semiosphere’s evolution. Regardless of whether robust empirical
verification of this speculative remark is pending, Foucault, at least in his post-panopticon
(aka Discipline and Punish) writings, endorses a completely different outlook to the
production of culture in terms of a matrixial and decentralized organization. “The dispositif
is spread out, sprawling, multidimensional, enveloping extensions both in space and time,
interconnecting, without a clear centre or commanding instance” (West-Pavlov 2009: 150).
5.2 Lotman vs. Deleuze (& Guattari)
The semiosphere begins to seriously ‘lose on post-modernist points’ once compared and
contrasted with Deleuze (& Guattari’s) conception of ‘territory’. Despite the fact that overall
Lotman’s cultural theory wavers between structuralism (e. g., binarism, hierarchical
structures) and post-structuralism (e. g., fluid boundaries among codes and semiotic spaces,
not strictly reducible to binarist pairs), clinging onto the possibility of a hierarchical ordering
of semiotic spaces and texts in the determination of a cultural centre (driven by an obscure
‘necessity’ for upholding the uniformity of a culture, also reflected in Andrews’ [2003: 109]
contention that a culture always selects a set of texts asmetatexts which obliterates any human
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agency from the ‘selection’ process) is inmarked contrast with the emancipatory (from state-
regulated, striated-space), deterritorializing, rhizomatic and non-arborescent discursive
structures envisioned by Deleuze & Guattari in the two volumes of Capitalism &
Schizophrenia (but also in individual works by Deleuze and Guattari).
Deleuze’s reflection on space is “rhizomatic” rather than “arborescent”. Deleuze’s theory of space
is not built like a tree, with a central hierarchical trunk fromwhich subordinated ‘branches’ then
spread out, themselves branching off into smaller twig-like subtopics. Rather, his theory of space
seems to develop horizontally, spreading out tendrils and runner-shoots which then cross each
other at some later point, forming a dense web of allusions and interconnections. (West-Pavlov
2009: 171)
This fundamental premise of Deleuze and Guattari’s post-modernist (aka post-hierarchical)
theorization of spatial organization as an attempt to endorse the originary flux of becoming
without reducing it to binary structures is in stark contrast to the Lotmanian semiosphere
which does retain hierarchical structruring and binarism as a fundamental form of
organization of a semiotic universe (for example, see Lotman 1990: 124: “Binarism and
asymmetry are the two rules binding any semiotic system”). “Deleuze and Guattari eschew
themere inversion of binary hierarchies for the simple reason that such binaries are from the
outset bound into the underlying economy of absence and presence. It is this fundamental
binary which they wish to eradicate, instead proposing flow as an option towards which we
would do well to move” (West-Pavlov 2009: 178). However, despite the fact that binarism is
recruited by Lotman in the analysis of structures of literaryworks, in principle and onvarious
instances throughout his writings the attempt to move beyond binarism, at least as
fundamental form of semiotic organization, is also evident. Thus, when he talks about
mapping dynamic processes whereby a semiospheric space changes, he includes the observer
towhom a configuration of semiospheric space appears as such at a certain point in time. The
descriptive crystallizations of semiospheric configurations follow a far from tidy binarist
structural logic. However, Lotman does not dispense with binarism altogether, as against
Deleuze & Guattari.
For Deleuze &Guattari space is first and foremost process, as territorialization. Territory,
as this or that space (place), is the outcome of the process of territorialization. Territor-
ialization is not grounded in a pre-given container, as seems to be the case with the
semiosphere which does constitute (even metaphorically) a sort of Newtonian container
wherein change takes place. “It is not that there is a space that is then qualified; rather, forces
produce qualities and qualities produce fields or spaces, ‘blocs of becoming’ (West-Pavlov
2009: 181). Rather, territories are metaphorical constructs that seek to encapsulate the
outcome of a non-ground as process of territorialization. Again, this should be marked as a
fundamental distinction between Lotman’s pre post-modernist and Deleuze & Guattari’s
post-modernist account of spacing. “Territoriality is thus a process which creates insides and
outsides, limits, zones, unevenness” (West-Pavlov 2009: 180–181). One might say that if
Deleuze&Guattariwere to rewrite the semiosphere theywould probably characterize it as the
outcome of the process of semiosis, rather than a hyper-space wherein semiosis is contained.
However, the very fluid process of spacingwithin the semiosphere and the constantly shifting
boundaries among cultural spaces, in Lotman’s terms, do exhibit considerable similarities
with the constant process of deterritorialization and retteritorialization that is put forward by
Deleuze & Guattari. “Territoriality takes pre-existing flows, the fluid materiality of being in
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itself in its state of becoming, and begins to make semi-formalized domains out of it. These
domains are by no means permanent. They may dissolve once again back into the flux of
being, only to be reformalized in another form, in another place, by the desiring attraction
and conjunction of several elements” (West-Pavlov 2009: 181).
At this juncture it is also prudent to make a detour towards the earlier analysis on Kant’s
conceptualization of space and readDeleuze &Guarttari’s concept of territorialization under
a modernist prism, so to speak. In these terms, whereas for Kant the allocation of space to
empirical phenomena would be incumbent on a pure form of sensibility as space (as pure
representation), for Deleuze & Guattari the very possibility of producing a pure form of
sensibility is incumbent on the fluxofmatter (obviously a paralogism, inKantian terms). This
radical materialist account that echoes Heraclitus’ flux seems to constitute a lapse to pre-
Kantian empiricism, against which Kant sought to argue. In fact, Deleuze has been
particularly pre-occupied with a return to the ding-an-sich (as field of intensities) which,
according toKant, is not knowable as such, but only by recourse to the categories of empirical
understanding which depend on how objects appear to space and time as pure forms of
sensibility. Surely this is an argument that may not be fully tackled within the confines of this
paper. However, in order to fully appreciate the differences and perhaps points of intersection
between Lotman and post-modernism,we should at least take into account the different tasks
that Kant’s first Critique and Deleuze & Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus sought to accomplish Thus,
whereas the former sought to address epistemological issues and to furnish primary
conditions for the possibility of knowledge, the latter were concerned with the possibility of
producing emancipatory discourses (e. g., endorsing the singular assemblages that emerge in
the flux of schizophrenic discourses as modeling system) that would eschew the totalizing
power of striated state-space.
Smooth space, the ‘territoriality’ of nomadic movement, is not marked by the pre-formed routes
of roads, canals and fences which are characteristic of the state, and of the institutionalized
attempts to control and subjugate the turbulences of water in the landscape [. . .] Smooth space is
explored without calculation, without being quantified, it is constituted as a body of
‘rhizomatiques’ which are explored in the moment of travelling. (West-Pavlov 2009: 182)
Smooth space, as against semiospheric space, is not demarcated by boundaries, however
flexible and membrane-like these boundaries may be, but by singular and non-retraceable
‘lines of flight’. Hard as it may be to argue for which modeling metaphor (i. e., Lotman’s
membranes vs. Deleuze and Guattari’s lines of flight) is more apt for encapsulating the non-
regimented process of constant reterritorialization, indubitably they both point to the multi-
directional cross-fertilizations that take place in cultural hyperspace, with the difference that
whereas for the former this taking-place is already situated within the container of the
semiosphere, for the latter ‘it takes place’ in the pure extra-semiospheric void that in fact
appears to be conditioning the very conceptualization of a semiosphere. “Deleuze and
Guattari advocate the construction of nomadic ‘lines of flight’ in order to experiment with
implicit connections currently imperceptible to the subject that could be actualised into new
realities” (Lorraine 2005: 163). “A nomadic style of subjectivity consists in the unfolding of
patterns that are not referred to an external plan of organisation or conventional notions of
space and time, but rather evolve from the force of patterns immanent to the individual in its
specific milieu” (Lorraine 2005: 171).
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The generation of cultural spaces, from a Deleuzian point of view, entails a prioritization of
the production of non consciousness-centric differences, and their non-reduction to binarist
pairs. This stance is indicative of the wider polemic that Deleuze launched against Hegelian
dialectics as the work of ‘negative theology’ (see Rossolatos 1995) cloaked under the
progressive evolution of Geist. On the contrary, Deleuze endorses a purely differential
becoming (as originally conceived by Heraclitus), while explicitly positing that any form of
oppositional thinking, and hence binarism, constitutes an arbitrary imposition which must
be given up in favor of situational vectors that map relative positions and the co-evolution
between subject and its natural surroundings (as a proxy to the potential encapsulation of
presence in its presencing prior to its succumbing to the thanatographical repetition of re-
presentation; see Rossolatos 1995). “Difference, not opposition, is the real movement of
thought. It is the principle or origin of the dialectic. For this reason, Deleuze writes, “the
negative expires at the gates of being. Opposition ceases its labor and difference begins its
play” (Hughes 2009: 49).
Sedentary distribution is the thinking of the ‘classical’world (romantic revolt also belongs to this
world). Deleuze calls such a thinking the ‘philosophy of representation’. The authority which it
obeys is the principle of identity, whose mark is found in the iterative prefix RE- of the word
‘representation’. Every present must be re-presented, in order that it may be re-discovered as the
same; it follows that in this philosophy the unknown is only ever a not-yet-recognised known,
that to learn is to remember, that to encounter is tomeet again, that to leave is to return, etc.What
eludes this rationalism, then, is difference as such. The difference between discovery and
rediscovery is the gap which separates an experience from its reiteration – whence the problem
of repetition. (Descombes 1998: 154)
If post-modernity has been identified with the movement of the so-called ‘philosophy of
difference’ and Deleuze & Guattari constitute most prominent representatives, and if the
repercussions of the dismantling of consciousness and oppositional thinking as prototypical
concepts of the Western philosophical tradition afforded to open up new ways of theorizing
space, then Lotman’s semiosphere, by virtue of clinging onto binarism and consciousness as
integral parts of the semiosphere, may hardly be approached as a post-modernist concept.
And yet, insofar as the semiosphere does include a level of dynamism in its constant
mutations that is similar to the process of territorialization, it may be said to include facets of
the philosophy of difference.
In conclusion, Lotmanoscillates constantly betweenmodernity and post-modernity in an
attempt to salvage (perhaps) the tradition from the lavaic overflow of the philosophy of
difference, while recognizing that if a sufficient account of the formative mechanisms of
culture is to be yielded, then we have to move towards post-modernity.
In an attempt to extendDeleuze’s anti-oppositional thinking andwith view to reconciling
it with the Lotmanian semiospheric conception, I would be inclined to argue that they both
converge on the pre-Socratic philosopher’s Empedocles conception of the ‘sphere’. Based on
Empedocles’ cosmogonical poem (at least the fragments that have been bequeathed to us),
phenomena appear through the interplay between the antagonizing forces of Love (Filotes)
and Strife/Hatred (Neikos). These forces are situated at the level of pure becoming, that is the
irreducible Many (or sensory manifold in the context of the Kantian Transcendental
Aesthetic). In fact, the One emerges from the Many, in contrast to monistic cosmogonical
accounts (e. g., Parmenides). The cosmos is conceived in the form of a sphere whose
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continent is originally stable thanks to the predominance of the forces of Love (hence its
denomination as sphere of Love byGuthrie 1980: 166).Once Strife enters the sphere, the once
stabilized elements re-enter a trajectory of de-territorialization (as Deleuze would put it).
Love intervenes once again, thus culminating in the elements’ stabilizing anew in determinate
spaces within the sphere (they become re-territorialized). Indeed, the similarities in the
employment of the spheric metaphor between Lotman and Empedocles are striking,
inasmuch as between Deleuze’s processes of de-territorialization and re-territorialization
(which are akin to Lotman’s de- and re-semiotization; see Section 2) and Empedocles’
conception of the constant re-organization of the Sphere’s space in the context of the
conflicting forces of Love and Strife (see Rossolatos 1997).
In this sense, neither Lotman, nor Deleuze are post-modernists, but philosophers of
becoming, inasmuch as Heraclitus was a philosopher of becoming, long before his
appropriation by Hegel or Marx. Lotman’s attempt to theorize culture through a philo-
sophical prism of becoming urged him to revert to such primordial concepts as the sphere in
order to transfer us metaphorically to a space that is neither dependent on Reason, nor the
outcome of thinking processes, but, on the contrary, where Reason, as aspect of cultural
production, is machinically assembled with a movement that underlies it and that may be
mapped out not strictly through binarist pairs, but as lines of flight and as constantly shifting
boundaries (membranes) among provisionally crystallized and constantly shifting semio-
spheric spaces.
Finally, a point of intersection between Deleuzian materialist ontology and the semio-
spheremay be discerned in terms of what,most cryptically, has been termed by Lotman as the
semiosphere’s constituting the minimal unit of analysis: “The unit of semiosis, the smallest
functioning mechanism, is not the separate language, but the whole semiotic space of the
culture in question. This is the space we term the semiosphere” (Lotman 1990: 125) One
would expect that semiosphere, in its all-encompassing capacity vis-à-vis enunciators, texts
and individual signs, would be, andhas been interpreted repeatedly (cf. Section 2) as being the
plenum of all possible units making up a culture, rather than the minimal unit of analysis. A
tentative answer to this paradoxical remark is that insofar as semiosphere includes not only
what is manifested as the outcome of territorialization, but the very event (in Deleuzian
terms, as a theoretical freeze-frame on the first stages of the formation of empirical concepts
according to Kant’s firstCritique) where a stimulus (or a nano-particle of the primary hylean
flux) impacts on the sensory apparatus of a subject (the aleatoric point of the encounter that
allows for the actualization of signification, yet which, precisely as encounter, always rests in
virtuality; cf. Hughes 2009: 143), then semiosphere is also the subject of scrutiny. In short,
unless we are capable of accounting for shifts in themateriality of becoming in the first place,
how can we ensure adequacy in any account concerning the communicative sublation
whereby the stimulus is appropriated through signs and interpretatnts that make up a textual
edifice? Deleuze seeks constantly to return to this primary event as the heart of the
paralogically noumenal ding-an-sich that is retained in Lotman’s semiosphere as the
impossible to be accounted for and at the same time reason for positing the semiosphere
as minimal unit of cultural signification.
But doesn’t this parallel, one might ponder, reflect more accurately the notion of
biosphere and natural space rather than semiosphere and cultural space? Insofar as Deleuze’s
conception of territorialization does not make this crude distinction or, rather, precedes this
distinction (which would merely amount to re-lapsing into a binarist rationale as an after-
Is the semiosphere post-modernist? 111
shock of territorialization), then the parallel not only is justified, but mandatory. Deleuze,
inasmuch as Lotman, furnishmodeling systems that are outcomes of ‘thought-in-becoming’,
where becoming is viewed from a spatial point of view as process of territorialization
(Deleuze) -the spacing that gives space (and let it be noted that in French donner lieu [giving
space] is synonymous with creating)- or emerging semiotic spaces in a semiosphere, where a
semiosphere, just like a territory, is “superabstract and infraconcrete” (Massumi 1996: 99)
and hence may be approached at the same time as the minimal unit of analysis inasmuch as
the all-encompassing hyperspace that conditions existentially its flow of becoming.
6 Conclusion
In this paper an attempt wasmade at shedding light on points of divergence and convergence
between Lotman’s concept of the semiosphere and seminal modernist and post-modernist
conceptualizations of space, the production of discourse and subjectivity. Overall, the
semiospherewas found to be rather pre-post-modernist in its undue focus on power relations
as constitutive of discursive formations on which the notion of subjectivity is incumbent
(compared with Foucault), but also in its (quasi)adherence on binarism and the hierarchical
organization ofmeaningwithin a semiospheric space.However, these points of divergence do
not necessarily render the semiosphere modernist stricto sensu. In an attempt to encapsulate
multi-directional andmulti-faceted becoming within a semiospheric space, Lotman’s theory
was found to be similar in various salient facets to Deleuze and Guattari’s process of
territorialization, albeit different in its retention of a ‘container’ rationale. Certainly the
scrutinized facets are not exhaustive with regard to the vast conceptual spectrumwhere such
differences and similarities may be pinpointed, however they attain to point out relevant
directions whereby the semiosphere may be dialogically extended and enriched with view to
finding its proper ‘metaspace’ amidst the post-modern vernacular.
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